Showing posts with label Secularism (Australia). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Secularism (Australia). Show all posts

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Reflections on Williams II

The High Court’s recent decision in the second Williams case is widely seen as a defeat for the Commonwealth.  The Court invalidated, for the second time, the federal government’s school chaplaincy program.  As many predicted at the time it was passed (just days after the first Williams decision was handed down), Parliament’s 2012 emergency legislation, the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (FFLAA), was not enough to save the program.

In perhaps the most important respect, however, the Commonwealth won as it lost.  The High Court focused with laser-beam like precision on the chaplaincy aspect of the legislation and did not invalidate any other aspect of the FFLAA.  That means the 400+ other programs supported by it remain valid unless and until an individual plaintiff with standing challenges, one at a time, the constitutionality of the programs.  The Commonwealth would likely succeed on defending many of those programs given the High Court’s relatively liberal interpretation of the heads of legislative power in the Constitution; and even those programs that probably are not constitutional will not actually be struck down due to the lack of a challenge.  If one looks at the Commonwealth’s actions from a cynical perspective, the always-dubious emergency legislation bought two more years of chaplaincy and the potential for the vast majority of its other programs to remain in operation even if theoretically unconstitutional.

The simple truth is that the “loser pays” system in Australia makes it extremely rare for individuals to bring constitutional claims: the risk of owing tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees is often too much for anyone besides unions, corporations, and wealthy individuals to take.  Citizen-activists like Ronald Williams (and, earlier, Bryan Pape) are thus the exception.  They should be applauded for their courage and willingness to further a vision of what the Constitution demands, even if we may disagree with them on the legal or political merits of their challenges.  In an ideal world, the High Court would make it easier for citizen-activists to bring constitutional claims by relaxing strict rules of standing and Parliament would encourage these attempts to enforce the rule of law by legislating, as the U.S. does in civil rights claims, that a non-vexatious plaintiff will never pay the government’s legal costs.

What will happen to chaplaincy itself?  As the High Court has stated that there is no plausible head of power to support it, no future federal legislation can directly fund it.  The possibility often floated is for the Commonwealth to use the Section 96 grants power to channel money to the states on the condition that they use that money for chaplaincy.  At first glance this seems like an easy workaround, but in truth it may create major complications and changes to how the chaplaincy program functions.  States would gain the power to negotiate over the terms, and it would be State administrative bureaucracies overseeing the spending.  Some states traditionally hostile to chaplaincy, like New South Wales, might refuse the money altogether.  Others might insist, despite the current federal government’s wishes, that the money be available for both religious and secular chaplains.  Perhaps one of the most intriguing possibilities is that state agencies could bypass the evangelical chaplaincy service providers that have gained an effective monopoly in states like Queensland.  If this occurs, the proportion of chaplains who are Christian (currently 99.5%) could become closer to that of the Australian population (61%); a clear win for religious diversity and pluralism in Australia.

The long-term effects of the Williams pair of cases remain to be seen.  Although it is clear that most forms of executive spending require independent legislative support, the precise scope of this general rule remains unclear and the government is sure to test it through a variety of clever schemes.  The disparity in reasoning in Williams I itself is problematic in understanding the boundaries imposed on executive spending: for example, much was made in that case on the role of the Senate and deliberative democracy, but all of that discussion  vanished completely in Williams II.  To my mind, the only safe bet is that the Williams cases will linger over Commonwealth spending like a dark and cryptic shadow for years to come.

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Is Section 116 a "right" or merely a "limitation on . . . legislative power"?

I wrote the following as a footnote to a paper on witchcraft, fortune-telling, and what I call "the new spirituality."  After the footnote got longer and longer, I realised I needed to excise it and change the text to avoid the dispute entirely.  Still, I think it's an important topic and one I hope to revisit in the future.
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One can quibble about whether Section 116, the Australian Constitution’s provision regarding religious freedom, should be labelled a “right.”  See, e.g., Kruger v. Commonwealth, (1997) 190 CLR 1, 124-25 (per Gaudron, J.) (“It makes no sense to speak of a constitutional right to religious freedom in a context in which the Constitution clearly postulates that the States may enact laws in derogation of that right.  It follows, in my view, that s. 116 must be construed as no more than a limitation on Commonwealth legislative power . . . it cannot be construed as impliedly conferring an independent or free-standing right”).  However, styling Section 116’s religious freedom guarantee as a “limitation on . . . legislative power” rather than a “right” is illogical.  The wording of Section 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for . . . prohibiting the free exercise of any religion”) and the wording of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”) are both expressed as direct restraints on legislative power, but the latter has always been understood to confer an individual right to relief.  Further, Justice Gaudron’s reference to Section 116 not restraining the States is irrelevant to whether Section 116 is a “right” or not; rights always prohibit some actors from doing something, but not other actors from doing the same thing.  The First Amendment was held not to restrict state action until the twentieth century; the rights in American state constitutions do not limit the Federal government; domestic constitutional rights instruments rarely, if ever,  provide relief against the actions of foreign governments; few rights documents (the Quebec Charter excepted) provide claims for relief from non-governmental actors at all.  In Australia, as in every jurisdiction that has the equivalent of a “standing” doctrine, a claim for relief will always be brought by a particular organisation or association who asserts that its religious beliefs or actions have been burdened.  It thus makes little sense to talk about a restraint on interference with the free exercise of religion in the absence of an acknowledgement that without individuals (and the associations) they form, there is no exercise of religion to be prohibited in the first place.  Indeed, styling a constitutional provision as a “right” versus a “legislative prohibition” likely goes more to what remedy should be made (invalidation of a statute or a “constitutional exception”) than whether a claim for relief should be allowed at all.

Thursday, October 24, 2013

"Religion, Secularism, and the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program"

A working draft of my new article Religion, Secularism, and the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program is now available for free download on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

"This article examines the structure and function of the Commonwealth of Australia's National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program (NSCSWP) in the context of an inquiry into whether the program should be considered religious, secular, or somewhere in between. The argument advanced is that changes to the program since its inception have rendered it incoherent in purpose and internally contradictory in design. Because of these flaws, the NSCSWP fails to effectively achieve legitimate policy goals. However, the Program can be redesigned to achieve its ends while simultaneously welcoming religious individuals and remaining faithful to a liberal vision of neutrality towards religion."

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

"Church and State: Australia's Imaginary Wall"

Tom Frame, Church and State: Australia's Imaginary Wall (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006).

Frame's slim book (96 pages) adopts a middle-ground on the debate over the relationship between church and state in Australia.  He argues that both the Christian majority and the secular minority should refrain from extremist positions.  For Christians, Frame supports his argument with a reference to both history and theology:

"It can be said with some certainty, however, that there is nothing in the Bible or in Christian history which justifies or encourages the fusion of church and state.  It harms religion and distorts the church.  While it might be appealing to Christians starved of social or political influence to embrace the state, merging church and state into a single entity would not deliver what its advocates promise." (p. 31)

For secularists, Frame argues:

"Australia does not need a wall of separation between church and state, and none will be needed in the near future if the recent past is any guide."  (p. 95)

Overall, Frame suggests that Christians focus on spiritual outreach and reformation of individuals instead of trying to coercively influence public life through government support, while simultaneously suggesting that secularists be content with non-coercive, non-denominational governmental displays that reflect the heritage of the Christian majority.

In regards to the religious beliefs of Australians, Frame offers an interesting perspective:

"I concluded some time ago that Australians are generally indifferent to religious concepts, other than when they might demand some moral response, and that they are spiritually unresponsive.  To the vast majority, religion is largely about formalised rituals of commemoration.  Spirituality is just another dimension of therapy for those so inclined.  A scent of Christianity continues to pervade the public sphere but it is fading fast."  (p. 67)

It is a brief book, but it is definitely well-research and well-written.  Trying to summarize the evolution of Christianity on the separation of church and state globally in fifteen pages is an impossible goal, but Frame does about as good a job as is possible.  There's also a brief summary of how the Australian Constitution and High Court treat religion, which is also useful for a quick overview.